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It is usually thought that a Beveridgean pension system redistributes income more
than a Bismarckian one, since it ensures replacement ratios that decrease with income.
We check the validity of this result when the fact that pension systems can redistribute
also through their eects on labor income is taken into account. Labor market institutions
turn out to be crucial. First we study an economy with a competitive labor market: quite
surprisingly, inequality is unaected by a reallocation of funds towards the Beveridgean
system. Then we introduce a minimum wage that creates unemployment on the unskilled
labor market: in this case the Beveridgean system is proved to reduce inequality.
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11 Introduction
Intragenerational redistribution, is one of the main objective of a pension
system; for example in the well known proposal of the World Bank (World
Bank 1994), the rst pillar should exactly perform this task, while the saving
or income smoothing function should be achieved by the second and the third
pillar.
One of the key elements that determines the degree of intragenerational
redistribution is the link between pension payments and social contributions.
Two main polar cases can be identied: a basic pension and a Bismarckian
pension system. A basic pension (BP), also called a Beveridgean pension, is
a 
at benet given to the old without work requirements or means test; it
could be seen as a partial basic income conditional on an age requirement
1. On the other hand a Bismarckian system links pension benets to wages,
i.e. the pension is a certain fraction of the labor income previously earned 2.
The common way to measure the redistributive eect of a pension system
is the relation between the replacement ratio (i.e. the ratio of the pension to
the earned income) and the earned income: if the replacement ratio is stable
across income groups, the system does not redistribute; if it decreases when
1The interest towards the introduction of a basic income (BI), that is "an income paid
by a political community to all its members on an individual basis, without means test
or work requirement"(Van Parijs 2000), is growing in these years. For the analysis of
the eects of the BI on economic performance and inequality see for example Rillaers
(2000); for the eects of the BI on the unemployment rate see Van der Linden (2002) and
(2004). Vanderborght (2002) discusses, from a political science point of view, the possible
implementation of the BI in Belgium and Netherlands. The BP is sometimes considered
as a rst step towards the BI.
2For the computation of the pension it can be considered either the entire earning
history of the individual or only the wages received in the last period of the working age.
2income increases, we have a redistributive eect.
In the Beveridgean system the replacement ratio is decreasing; in the
Bismarckian system it depends on the specic institutional features but it
is in general quite stable. For this reason a Bismarckian system is usually
thought to be less redistributive than a Beveridgean one.
Tab. 1 Replacement ratios across income groups in dierent countries3
Replacement ratios
Half Average Twice
France 84 84 73
Germany 76 72 75
Italy 103(1/4x) 90 84(3x)
Japan 77 56 43
United Kingdom 72 50 35
United States 65 55 32
Canada 76 44 25
Netherlands 73 43 25
New Zealand 75 38 19
Source: Disney and Johnson [2001]
According to this criterion, pension systems can be classied in dierent
groups. Table 1 reports replacement ratios across income groups for dierent
countries; in particular, data concern individuals with the average income,
half (for Italy 1/4) of the average income and twice (for Italy three times)
the average income. On one hand we have Bismarckian countries like France,
Germany and Italy, which show relatively stable replacement ratios. On the
other hand we have Canada, the Netherlands, and New Zealand which can
be classied as Beveridgean and are characterized by replacement ratios that
3For more data concerning European countries, see Conde-Ruiz and Profeta [2003].
3sharply decrease with income. Japan, United Kingdom and United States
represent mixed systems, with replacement ratios that decrease but at a
slower pace than in Beveridgean countries.
However, it should be remarked that this gives only a partial picture
of the eect of pension systems on income inequality. Data based on re-
placement ratios do not take a key element into account: the BP and the
Bismarckian systems create dierent incentives/disincentives on labor supply
(both on the number of hours worked and on the decision to participate to
the labor market) and thus aect labor income in dierent ways. As long as
this eect on labor supply is proportionally the same for all income groups,
it does not matter in term of redistribution and we do not gain much from
the introduction of an endogenous labor supply 4. However, if the elasticity
of labor supply with respect to a change in the benet formula is dier-
ent across income groups, pension systems redistribute not simply directly
through contributions and pension payments, but also through their eects
on labor income .
The implication is that a comparison in terms of redistribution between
the BP and the Bismarckian system should take the role of labor supply
into account. Empirically this is not an easy task, since it requires for each
income group the knowledge of the elasticity of labor supply with respect to
a change in the benet formula; looking at the replacement ratios is for sure
more direct. Nevertheless what we want to stress is that, in using simply
data on replacement ratios, one should be aware of the simplication implied
4The literature that studies the redistributive eects of pension systems, usually relies
implicitly on this assumption. Indeed the distorsive eect of pension systems on labor
supply is simply captured by assuming that a fraction (exogenously determined) of social
contributions is wasted. See for example Casarico and Devillanova[2003], Conde-Ruiz and
Profeta[2003], Pestieau[1999].
4in this methodology; a discussion of the role of labor supply in evaluating
the redistributive impact of a pension system and thus of the eect of this
simplication is the object of the paper.
To be more precise, we will consider an unfunded pension system com-
posed by two pillars: the rst pillar is the BP and the second one is the
Bismarckian pension; both pillars are nanced with a labor income tax and
we assume that at each period the social security budget is balanced. We
want to answer the following question: keeping constant the tax rate on la-
bor income, what are the eects of a policy that reallocates funds from the
Bismarckian system to the BP? Considering the tax rate on labor income
unchanged will allow us to isolate the eect of the dierent benet formulas
from that of the nancing mode.
To analyse the eects of pension systems on labor income, a crucial el-
ement is the way in which the labor market is modelled. We consider two
dierent cases. We start by assuming a competitive labor market: labor de-
mand equals labor supply and thus every change in labor supply results in
a variation in labor income. Then we take into account the fact that often
the labor market, especially for the unskilled, does not clear and thus labor
supply is greater than labor demand: as a consequence the unskilled labor
income could depend only on labor demand and not on labor supply and
thus it would not be aected by a change in the pension system that reduces
labor supply. We formalize this idea in a very simple way by introducing a
minimum wage in the unskilled labor market.
For a steady state growth path, the main eects of a reallocation of funds
from the Bismarckian to the Beveridgean system can be summarized as fol-
lows. We have no general equilibrium eects, in the sense that the interest
rate and the wage are unaected; this is due to the fact that labor supply
5and capital reduce in the same proportion. As a consequence output drops.
For what concerns inequality, the crucial element is that, assuming the same
preference for all individuals, the low skilled reduce their labor supply more
than the high skilled. In the case of perfect competition in both the skilled and
unskilled sectors, the nal eect turns out to be such that the life cycle in-
come is reduced by the same proportion for both the skilled and the unskilled
workers: thus, in contrast with the standard results that are simply based
on replacement ratios across income groups, income inequality is unaected.
Things are dierent if we introduce a minimum wage in the unskilled labor
market: in this case the life cycle income of the skilled still decreases, but
the life cycle income of the unskilled increases: thus inequality is reduced.
Finally we assess also the eect on individual utility. In the case of perfect
competition in both the skilled and unskilled sectors, the utility of the skilled
reduces while the eect on the utility of the unskilled is theoretically am-
biguous: though their income always decreases, their leisure could increase
even more compensating in terms of utility the drop in consumption levels.
In the case of a minimum wage in the unskilled labor market, we show that
the utility of the unskilled for sure increases, since their life cycle income is
increased and their leisure is unchanged; the eect on the utility of the skilled
is ambiguous.
The paper is organized in ve sections. Section 2 presents the general
features of the model. In Section 3, we consider the competitive equilibrium
and in Section 4, we study the economy with a minimum wage in the unskilled
labor market. Section 5 concludes. Appendix A and B contain some proofs.
62 The model
We use an OLG model in which there is a continuum of consumers divided in
two groups: the skilled ( group 1) and the unskilled (group 2) workers. Pop-
ulation is assumed to be constant and thus it is normalized to one. Moreover
we assume that the number of the skilled is equal to e, while the number of
the unskilled is equal to 1   e5.
Agents live for two periods and have perfect foresight. In the rst period
they supply lit units of labor and receive a wage wit, where the index i refers
to the skill (i 2 1;2); labor income is used to pay social contributions and
nance current consumption and savings. In the second period, they are
retired and nance their consumption using savings and the pension paid by
the government.
We here examine in detail the behavior of the government, the consumers
and the rms. Then we derive in sections 3 and 4 the equilibrium conditions
for the competitive economy and for the economy with a minimum wage in
the unskilled labor market.
In what follows we carefully make a distinction between labor supply
(that is denoted without any accent), labor demand (that is denoted by a
tilde) and labor eectively exchanged in the market (that is denoted by a
hat).
5In what follows we do not endogenize the choice to invest in human capital and we
focus on the role of labor supply; Docquier and Paddison (2003) study the eects of
dierent pension systems on the decision to invest in human capital.
72.1 Firms
We consider a representative rm that uses both skilled and unskilled labor.





~ L1t + ~ L2t
1 
(1)
where 0 <  < 1 is the exogenous relative productivity of the unskilled.
Prot maximization implies that, given the wage of the skilled w1t, the
wage of the unskilled w2t, and the interest rate Rt
6, capital demand and
labor demands are, for an interior solution (i.e. for positive demands for
both skilled and unskilled workers), such that:
Rt = ~ k
 1
t (2)
w1t = (1   )~ k

t (3)
w2t =  (1   )~ k

t (4)
where ~ k = Kt
~ Lt .
To have an interior solution, the ratio between the wages has to be equal
to , that is:
w2t = w1t (5)
If w2t > w1t the demand for the unskilled is zero and thus only equation
(3) and (2) hold; if w2t < w1t the demand for the skilled is zero and thus
only equation (4) and (2) hold.
2.2 Government
The government pays to each old age individual a pension:
Pit+1 = bt+1wit^ lit + pt+1 (6)
6We assume full depreciation and thus the user cost of capital is equal to the interest
rate.
8where the second term of the right hand side is the BP (thus it is independent
of labor income and the same across individuals of the same generation) and
the rst is the Bismarckian pension (which is a fraction bt+1 of the gross labor
income previously earned). On each young worker is levied a labor tax equal
to:
Tit+1 = t+1wit+1^ lit+1 (7)
We assume that the budget is balanced and thus we have:
ebt+1w1t^ l1t + (1   e)bt+1w2t^ l2t + pt+1 = et+1w1t+1^ l1t+1 + (1   e)t+1w2t+1^ l2t+1
(8)
Thus if we dene aggregate labor exchanged as:
^ Lt = e^ l1t + (1   e)^ l2t (9)
and we take (5) into account, the budget constraint of the government can
be written as:
bt+1w1t^ Lt + pt+1 = t+1w1t+1^ Lt+1 (10)





t=0 are exogenously given, while the sequence fbtg
1
t=0 of the Bis-
marckian pension parameter is endogenously determined according to equa-
tion (10), in order to ensure that the government budget is balanced. More-
over we assume that the tax rate is constant, that is t+1 = t =  for every
t. Thus equation (10) becomes:
bt+1 =
w1t+1^ Lt+1   pt+1
w1t^ Lt
(11)





Equation (12) simply means that the ratio between the BP and the aggregate
labor income of the previous period is kept unchanged over time, in such a
9way that the "generational" replacement ratio assured by the BP is the same







To keep things tractable, we take a convenient and quite standard specica-
tion for the utility function: we assume it is logarithmic in consumption and
linear in labor. Thus consumers solve the following optimization problem:
maxlogcit +  logdit+1   (1   lit) (14)
s:t:
cit = (1   )witlit   sit (15)
dit+1 = Rt+1sit + bt+1witlit + pt+1 (16)
In the way we have written the optimization program, it is implicit that
consumers know the formula according to which the pension is computed,
but does not take into account the fact that bt+1 and pt+1 also depend from
their own choices according to equations (13) and (12). The solutions to this
optimization problem are:
sit =






lit = (1 + )  
pt+1
[Rt+1(1   ) + bt+1]wit
(18)
From equation (17) we can see that savings are determined by two compo-
nents : since the logarithmic utility function is homothetic, the rst term is
as usual a fraction of labor income, which in this case has to be determined
since labor supply is endogenous; the second term depends on the BP. More-
over notice that the propensity to save out of labor income, i.e. sit=witlit,
10is higher for the skilled than for the unskilled; this is due to the fact that,
for high skilled workers non labor income represented by the BP is relatively
less important.
From equation (18) we can see that in absence of the BP labor supply is
independent of the wage, because the substitution eect is exactly oset by
the income eect: this is a standard feature with the assumed utility function.
Introducing non labor income, like the BP, alters the equilibrium between
these two eects and as a consequence labor supply depends positively on
wit.
3 Competitive equilibrium
If we substitute (12) into (18) we get:
lit = (1 + )  

w1t^ Lt
[Rt+1(1   ) + bt+1]wit
(19)
Aggregate labor supply is:
Lt = el1t + (1   e)l2t (20)
and thus substituting (19) into (20) we obtain:
Lt = (1 + )(e + (1   e))   

^ Lt
[Rt+1(1   ) + bt+1]
(21)
We assume that labor demand equals labor supply in both markets, and thus:
lit = ~ lit = ^ lit and Lit = ~ Lit = ^ Lit. As a consequence equation (21) becomes:
Lt = (1 + ) h
[Rt+1(1   ) + bt+1]
[Rt+1(1   ) + bt+1 + 
]
(22)
where  h = (e + (1   e)) is the average productivity. Substituting equation
(22) into equation (19), we have the individual labor supply:





[Rt+1(1   ) + bt+1 + 
]
(23)
11where hi is the productivity of agent i, that is h1 = 1 and h2 = .
We now consider the rule of accumulation of capital:
Kt+1 = St (24)
that simply states that the aggregate capital at time t + 1 is build up on
aggregate savings of the previous period. From equations (12) and (17),
aggregate savings are given by:
St =




and thus equation (24) can be written as:
kt+1Lt+1 =




Substituting equations (2), (3) and (22) into equations (26) and (13) we
get a system in bt+1 and kt+1. Once kt+1 is determined, Rt+1, w1t and w2t are
also determined. Then, knowing bt+1, w1t and Rt+1, we can determine labor
supplies, savings and consumption levels.
In the next subsection we solve the model for the case of a long run
equilibrium, i.e. a steady state.
3.1 Steady state
In steady state, equation (13) is:
b =    
 (27)
Using equations (2), (3) and (27), equation (26) becomes:
k =








(1   )(1   )




For our purpose it's important to notice that, since (29) does not depend
on 
 , the policy we are studying does not aect the ratio between capital
and aggregate labor; this means that K and L change in the same direction
and in the same proportion. As an implication, we have also that, according
to equations (2), (3) and (4), R, w1 and w2 remain unaected and thus,
a reallocation of funds between the BP and the Bismarckian system has no
general equilibrium eects, for a given value of the social contribution rate 
7.
Substituting equation (27) into equation (22), we can write aggregate
labor supply in steady state as:
L =
[R(1   ) + (   
)]
[R(1   ) + ]
(1 + ) h (30)
In the same way, we get individual labor supply:
li = (1 + )  
(1 + )











and second period consumption:
di = [R(1   ) +    
]whi (33)
7It can be shown that this result is still valid, as long as the utility function is a CES
in consumption (no matter which specication for the utility of leisure is assumed). The
assumption that turns out to be crucial, concerns the specic policy rule we have assumed
in equation (12), i.e. the assumption of a constant generational replacement ratio.
133.2 The steady state eects of a reallocation of funds
from the Bismarckian system to the Basic Pension
We are now ready to analyse the eects of an increase in 
. We can imme-
diately notice from (30) and (31) that both aggregate and individual labor
supply decrease. If we recall that, from equation (29), K change in the same
direction and proportion to L, we obtain that also the aggregate capital stock
is reduced; as a consequence both aggregate output and per capita output
drop. Thus we can conclude that the eects on economic performance are
negative.
It is important to analyse also the eects on individual variables. If we











we see that it is decreasing in absolute value in hi; thus the unskilled reduce
their work hours more than the skilled. The same is true also for the elasticity














The analysis of inequality is less straightforward. We dene the individual
life cycle income as:







Considering that b =    
 from (27) and p = 
w1^ L from (12) and using
aggregate and individual labor supply (30) and (31), yi becomes:













14Thus, though the high skilled reduce their labor supply more than the un-
skilled, the opposite is true for individual income; this is due to the fact
that the wage w1hi paid for one hour of work is higher for individual with
high productivity. But what really matters is the consequent eect on the









[R(1   ) +    
]
(39)
According to equation (39), the income of all households turns out to be
reduced in the same proportion, independently of their productivity endow-
ment hi. Thus if we measure inequality by an index that abstracts from
scale eects8, we obtain, quite surprisingly, that inequality is unaected by
a reallocation of funds from the Bismarckian system to the BP.
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Thus, the utility of the skilled decrease for sure, since in this case hi=1.
Utility of the unskilled could increase if their level of productivity hi = 
was suciently low : this is due to the fact that, though their income and
their consumption levels always decrease, their leisure could increase even
more, compensating the drop in c2 and d2.
8An inequality index is said to abstract from scale eects exactly when it is invariant to
a proportional change of all income. Most of the main indexes used, such as the Gini, the
Atkinson, and the Theil ones, satisfy this property. See Myles (1995) and the references
quoted therein.
153.3 Dynamics
In Section 3.2 we have analysed the long run eects of a change in parameter

; in this section we study the transition dynamics. In particular we ask if the
absence of general equilibrium eects of an increase in 
, is still valid during
the adjustment to the steady state. The answer turns out to be negative.
Moreover, we study the eect on individual utilities for each generation: we
show that a reallocation of funds towards the BP causes the unskilled to be
gainers and the skilled to be losers. This holds true for each generation.
For these purposes, we calibrate the model and we simulate it using
Dynare (see Juillard (1996)). The Blanchard-Kahn condition is satised
since there are ve eigenvalues larger than one in modulus for ve forward-
looking variables. For the calibration of the model, the length of a generation
is assumed to be 30 years. The key parameters we have to calibrate are: 
(the share of capital in the production function), A (the scaling factor of the
production function),  (the rate of time preferences),  (the productivity of
the unskilled),  (the social contribution rate). We assume standard values
for  and :  = 0:3 and  = 0:3 (which implies a quarterly discount factor
of 0;99). A is simply a scale parameter that is usually introduced in the
production function (that becomes Y = AKL1 ) and we set it equal to
9:5 . For the value of , we choose 0:4 in order to have a wage dispersion
characterized by the ratio highest to lowest wage (w1
w2 = 1
) equal to 2:5,that is
consistent with the evidence reported by Rillaers (2000) . Finally the value of
 is set equal to 0:15, as in Docquier and Paddison (2003). These parameters
imply a steady state annual interest rate of 4%.
We study the eect of a change in 
 from a value of 0;04 to a value of
0:09.9
9The results are qualitatively the same if we consider dierent initial and nal values
16First of all we consider the aggregate variables. Figures 1-6 show the
dynamic behavior of: the interest rate (R), the wage of the skilled (w1), the
ratio between aggregate capital and labor (k), the aggregate labor (L), the
aggregate capital (K), the aggregate saving (S).
In particular, from Figure 1 and 2 we can see that, although the steady
values of R and w1 remain unchanged, during the transition general equilib-
rium eects take place: initially R decreases and w1 increases, but, starting
from the second period, they respectively grow and drop so to achieve in
the fth period their previous values. These paths are determined by the
dynamics of k showed in Figure 3. The behavior of k can be understood by
looking at the response of L, K and S in Figures 4-6. In particular, the initial
increase in k is due to the nature of the variable K: K is predetermined at
the time in which the change in 
 takes place, because it is build up on sav-
ings of the previous period. Thus K starts decreasing only after one period,
while L and S immediately drop. In other words, a reallocation of funds
towards the BP has a negative eect on labor supply, while physical capital
is initially xed; this raises the marginal productivity of labor and decreases
the marginal productivity of capital, causing the wage and the interest rate
respectively to grow and to drop. The wages and the interest rate revert to
their initial level once capital adjusts to the new steady state.
Figure 7 and 8 show the utility respectively of skilled and of unskilled
workers. For the skilled, the eect turns out to be negative for all generations:
a reallocation of funds towards the BP causes the utility of these households
to drop until the new steady state is achieved. The opposite is true for the
unskilled, who, independently of the generation to which they belong, gain
for 
 (for example the initial value of 
 could be set equal to 0, if we want to study the
eects of an introduction of the BP).
17from an increase in 
.10
10Notice that the path of the utility of the unskilled is not monotonic (the maximum of
utility is reached after one period); however the utility is always above the level of the old
steady state.
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Fig. 2 Wages (w
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Fig. 3 Ratio between K and L (k)







Fig. 4 Aggregate labor supply (L)







Fig. 5 Aggregate capital (K)







Fig. 6 Aggregate saving (S)







Fig. 7 Utility of the skilled








Fig. 8 Utility of the unskilled
Figure 1: Dynamics
194 Equilibrium with a minimum wage
In the previous section we have assumed that w1t and w2t change in order
to clear both the skilled and the unskilled labor market. In this section we
continue to assume that the wage of the skilled w1t moves freely, but we
introduce a minimum wage  w2t in the unskilled labor market, that is:
w2t   w2t (41)
In particular, as in Cahuc and Michel (1996), we x:




2 is the steady state competitive wage, i.e. w
2 = (1 )k
ss with kss
given by equation (29); in other terms the minimum wage is constant over
time and higher than the steady state competitive wage.
As a consequence notice that aggregate labor exchanged is11:
^ Lt = e^ l1t + (1   e)^ l2t = el1t + (1   e)~ l2t (43)
Indeed w1t moves freely to clear the skilled labor market and thus l1t =
~ l1t = ^ l2t , while due to the presence of the minimum wage we have that
l2t  ~ l2t = ^ l2t (where the equality holds only when the minimum wage is not
binding).
The dynamics turns out to be characterized by three dierent regimes.
Depending on initial conditions we can start in any of these regimes; however,
as we will show, the dynamics is such that the economy ends up in the third
regime.
11For the notation we use see section 2
20First Regime: both skilled and unskilled workers are fully em-
ployed (w1t = w2t >  w2, l1t = ~ l1t = ^ l2t and l2t = ~ l2t = ^ l2t)
If w1t = w2t >  w2 is an equilibrium, i.e. the minimum wage is not
binding, both the skilled and the unskilled are fully employed. The dynamics
is the one of the competitive economy of section 3: thus kt has to converge to
kss and starts decreasing. As consequence also wages decrease; at a certain
point in time  t,  w2 is reached and the minimum wage becomes binding.
After time  t, wages should decrease to make aggregate labor demand equal
to aggregate labor supply; but this is not possible for the wage of the unskilled
due to the minimum wage. Notice that, since skilled and unskilled workers
are perfect substitutes due to equation (1), only aggregate labor demand
matters for the rm. Thus in a situation in which aggregate labor demand
is below aggregate labor supply, the composition of labor demand between
skilled and unskilled workers is not determined. If we assume that the rm
employs rst of all the unskilled, then the wage of the skilled immediately
decreases to clear the market and we jump directly to the third regime. If
we assume that the rm employs rst of all the skilled, then we enter in the
second regime, that, as we will see, nally ends up in any case in the third
regime.
Second Regime: skilled workers are fully employed and we
have partial involuntary unemployment among the unskilled (w1t =
w2t =  w2, l1t = ~ l1t = ^ l2t and l2t > ~ l2t = ^ l2t > 0)
At ^ t + 1, aggregate labor demand is below aggregate labor supply. If we
assume that the rm hires rst of all the skilled, we have that the skilled
are all employed, while in the labor market of the unskilled we have some
21involuntary unemployment. Since the labor market of skilled workers clears,
w1t does not change and we still have w1t = w2t =  w2.
Due to the fact that the minimum wage  w2 is constant, the same is true
also for w1t, kt and Rt+1; i.e. w1t =  w1, kt =  k, Rt+1 =  R. Thus using
equation (13) and the rule of accumulation of capital (24), the dynamics of






 w1^ Lt   
 = 
^ Lt+1





 R(1+)  w1^ Lt
(44)
Substituting the rst equation into the second one, we get:
^ Lt+1 = ^ Lt (45)
or, in terms of capital stock:
Kt+1 = Kt (46)
where:
 =
(1   )  w1  R
(1 + ) k  R +   w1
=
(1   )(1   )
(1 + ) + (1   )
 k
 1 (47)
According to equation (45), the sign of  is crucial in determining the behav-
ior of ^ Lt. Notice that from equation (42) we have:
(1   ) k




 k > kss (49)
from which, using equation (29), follows:
 k >
"
(1   )(1   )




Equation (50) implies that  < 1 and thus the sequence ^ Lt is decreasing.
22Third Regime: skilled workers are fully employed and we have
full involuntary unemployment among the unskilled (w1t < w2t =
 w2, l1t = ~ l1t = ^ l2t and l2t > ~ l2t = ^ l2t = 0)
However, the sequence ^ Lt is bounded below by labor supply of skilled
workers, because w1 can change freely: when ^ Lt starts becoming lower than
el1t, w1 decrease and we no longer have w1t = w2t =  w2. From then
onwards, labor demand for the unskilled ~ l2 is equal to zero. The economy is
not described by the system (44), but it simply resembles the dynamics of a
competitive economy like the one described in section 3, with the dierence
that now we have only skilled workers. Thus it converges to a steady steady,
on which we focus in the next subsections.
The result that in the long run all the unskilled are unemployed could
seem quite strange; however, if we consider that in the "two types" model
we are using the unskilled are simply the individuals at the bottom of the
distribution of abilities, it turns out to be more reasonable12.
4.1 Steady state
As we have shown above, the economy nally ends up in the third regime
and converges to a steady state. In steady state, the ratio between aggregate
stock of capital and aggregate labor is still given by equation (29) and thus
it is the same of an economy without a minimum wage. However, aggregate
stock of capital and aggregate quantity of labor have for sure dierent values
12This result depends on the assumption of a constant minimum wage over time; Cahuc
and Michel (1996) consider also a dierent case. We do not pursue this point here since
our purpose is not to study the implication of dierent minimum wage policies, but to
introduce in a simple way some form of unemployment and study its implication for the
redistributive role of pension systems.
23with respect to section 3. In particular, as we have said before, the demand
for the unskilled ~ l2 is equal to zero, and the aggregate labor demand is equal
to the aggregate labor supply of the skilled, i.e.:
L = ~ L = el1 (51)
Thus using equations (12),(13), (18) and (51) we get the expression for labor
supply of the skilled13:
l1 = (1 + )
[R(1   ) +    
]
[R(1   ) +    
(1   e)]
(52)
4.2 The steady state eects of a reallocation of funds
from the Bismarckian system to the Basic Pension
As in the case of a competitive economy we have that, when 
 increase, k,
R and w1 do not change, i.e. we have no general equilibrium eects.




=  (1 + )e
R(1   ) + 
[R(1   ) +    
(1   e)]
2 (53)
that is negative. As a consequence, since k = K
el1 does not change when 

increase, we have that K has to decrease; thus also aggregate and per capita
output drop.
We now study the eect of a reallocation of funds toward the BP on life
cycle income inequality. The income of the skilled is the same as the case
of a competitive economy and decreases as 
 increase. The income of the









13We focus on labor supply of the skilled, since labor supply of the unskilled is not
relevant in determining the eects on income inequality, due to the fact that the demand
of unskilled labor is equal to zero in steady state.
24It can be shown (see Appendix A) that the derivative of the BP with respect
to 
 is positive and thus the income of the unskilled increases (Notice that
this is not trivial since 
 on one hand as a positive eect on p and on the
other hand has a negative impact on it since it reduces l1).
Since income of the skilled decreases while income of the unskilled in-
creases, income inequality is reduced.
Finally we compute the eect on individual utilities.
It can be shown (see Appendix B) that the eect on the utility of the
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has an ambiguous sign. However for 
 that tend to zero, i.e. if we are con-
sidering the introduction of a BP, the utility of the skilled for sure decreases.
The utility of the unskilled increases for sure, since income and thus
consumption levels increase and leisure is unchanged.
5 Conclusions
The aim of this work is to study the eects of a basic pension, whose dis-
tinctive feature is the independence on work requirements. To capture this
specicity and isolate the eect of dierent benet formulas from that of the
nancing mode, we study a policy that reallocates funds from a Bismarckian
pension scheme to a basic pension, keeping social contributions unchanged.
We model this policy assuming that the basic pension is linked to the aggre-
gate labor income of the previous period to have a constant 'generational'
replacement ratio. To keep the analysis tractable, we make some simplifying
assumptions. In particular we use specic functional forms for the utility
25and the production functions.
The result concerning the eects on economic performance is robust to
dierent assumptions for the utility function, as long as labor supply is up-
ward sloping (i.e. the substitution eect prevails on the income eect). The
absence of eects on inequality in the competitive economy, for sure depends
crucially on the functional form that we have used. However, the main mes-
sage, i.e. the fact that the redistribution of a pension system could be reduced
by eects passing through labor supply, is still valid as long as we consider
utility functions for which the elasticity of labor supply to the reallocation
of funds is higher for the unskilled than for the skilled.
Through the paper we assume perfect substitution between skilled and
unskilled workers and a useful extension is the introduction of a certain degree
of complementarity between the two types of labor.
Further research will be important to a have a more general picture of the
role that labor supply and labor market institutions could play in determining
the shape and the size of the eects of pension systems on income inequality.
Our purpose in this paper is to draw the attention on this issue and to start
exploring it.
We show that in the long run a reallocation of funds towards the basic
pension has no general equilibrium eects, since the interest rate and the wage
are unaected. Moreover it has a negative impact on economic performance,
since labor supply, capital and output drop.
The working of the labor market is crucial for the eect on income in-
equality; we distinguish two dierent cases: in the rst one all markets are
competitive, while in the second one there is a minimum wage in the unskilled
labor market. In the competitive economy case, a reallocation of funds to-
wards the basic pension does not aect income inequality, since life cycle
26incomes of the skilled and of the unskilled decrease in the same proportion.
In the economy with a minimum wage, the eect of this policy is to decrease
the life cycle income of the skilled, while increasing the life cycle income of
the unskilled: as a consequence income inequality is reduced. The explana-
tion of the dierent results we get in these two cases, relies on the fact that
in the presence of a minimum wage we have an excess of supply of unskilled
labor and thus only labor demand matter in determining the quantity of un-
skilled labor that is eectively exchanged in the market; as a consequence a
reduction in the labor supply of the unskilled does not aect their life cycle
income. One implication of our results is that, when measuring the eects
of pension systems on inequality, looking simply at the replacement ratios
across income groups could be a partial procedure; one should be aware of
the role that labor supply and labor market institutions could play.
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29Appendix A
In this Appendix we prove a result used in Section 4.2: when 
 increases,
the BP and thus the income of the unskilled increase.
This is not trivial because 
 on one hand as a positive eect on p and on
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The numerator of this expression can be written as:
[R(1   ) + ]
| {z }
+










which would be positive if:
[R(1   ) +    2
] > 0 (58)
Using equations (29) and (2) to obtain R, this inequality could be written
as:
(1 + ) + (1   ) + (1   )   (1   )
   (1   )
 > 0 (59)
that holds for sure since  > 
.





In this Appendix we prove a result used in Section 4.2: the derivative of the
utility function of the skilled with respect to 
 is given by equation (55).





















c1 and d1 turns out to be the same as in equations (32) and (33), while @l1
@

is given by equation (53) ; substituting into (60) we get equation (55).
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